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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOWELLS I INC . I 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
WILLIAM NELSON, aka 
WILLIAM LORD ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14829 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Howells, Inc., appeals from a 
judgment of the Fourth Judicial Court of Utah County, 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On September l, 1976, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court awarded Judgment against Defendant in an 
amount of $2,852.66 for a bad check which had been 
written by Defendant to Plaintiff in that amount. The 
trial court, however, refused to hold Defendant, William 
Nelson personally liable for said check and further 
refused to grant Plaintiff attorney's fees for the 
prosecution of the action. Thereafter Appellant filed 
notice of appeal. 
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RELIEf SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a ruling from this Court as 
a matter of law that Defendant, William Nelson is per-
sonally liable for the amount of said check and that 
Plaintiff should have been awarded reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 5, 1976, Defendant, William Nelson 
issued a check to Howells, Inc., in an amount of $2,852.66. 
The check was drawn on an acount entitled "William Lord 
Associates," and was signed by William Nelson. When 
the check was given to Plaintiff's agent, Ettie Mosher, 
the Defendant asked Mrs. Mosher to hold the check for 
two weeks before depositing the same for payment. Said 
check was deposited on February 26, 1976, after which 
it was returned to Plaintiff unpaid, by reason of in-
sufficient funds in the acount of "William Lord Associates." 
The check was again submitted on approximately March 2, 
1976, with the same result. The check still has not 
been paid. 
At the time of trial on September 1, 1976, 
the Defendant did not appear, but was represented by 
his Counsel, Mr. Rex Lewis. The Plaintiff appeared 
-2-
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through it's agent Ettie Mosher, who testified concerning 
the issuance of the check to Plaintiff. Evidence was 
introduced to show that there was no corporation 
"William Lord Associates" nor was there any certificate 
filed for an assumed name with the Secretary of State. 
Evidence was also introduced to show that "William 
Lord Corporation" was a corporation incorporated in 
the State of Utah. 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact, 
found that "William Lord Associates" was intended by 
Defendant to be an assumed name for "William Lord 
Corporation" and therefore refused to hold William 
Nelson personally liable for said check. The trial 
court also found that since the check had been given 
to Plaintiff by Defendant with a request to hold it 
for two weeks before depositing it, the check was a 
promissory note and not a check within the meaning 
of chapter 15 of title 7, Utah Code Annoated, as amended 
1953. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRI~L COURT ERRED _IN NOT AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFF. 
Chapter 15 of Title 7, Utah Code Annoated, 
as amended, 1953, provides: 
-3-
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7-15-1. Drawing or issuing against non-
existent account or insufficient funds-Intent 
to def~aud-Civil liability-Damages.-(1) Any 
person who willfully, with intent to defraud, 
makes, draws or issues any check, draft or 
order upon any bank, banking association or 
other depsitory for the purpose of obtaining 
from any person, firm, partnership or cor-
poration any money, merchandise, property, 
or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary or rent, which check. 
draft or order which is not honored upon presentment 
because the maker, drawer or issuer does not 
have the account with the depositary upon 
which the check, draft or order has been made 
or drawn, or does not have sufficient funds 
in such account or sufficient credit with such 
depositary for payment of the check, draft 
or order in full, shall be liable to the holder 
of the check, draft or order in a civil 
action as provided in this section. 
2) In such civil action the person making 
drawing or issuing the check, draft or order 
shall be liable to the holder of it for the 
amount thereon, for interest and all costs 
of collection, including all court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees. 
7-15-2. Civil action-Evidence of intent.-
In any such civil action any of the following 
shall be prima facie evidence that the person 
making, drawing or issuing the check, draft 
or order did so willfully with an intention 
to defraud: 
1) Proof that at the time of issuance, the 
maker, drawer or issuer did not have the account 
with the depositary upon which the check, draft 
or order was made or drawn or did not have 
sufficient funds in his account or credit with 
the depositary for payment in full of the check, 
draft or order, and that he failed within ten 
days after receiving notice of nonpayment or 
dishonor to pay the check, draft or order; or 
2) Proof that when presentment was made 
-4-
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within a reasonable time, the maker, drawer 
or issuer did not have the account with 
the depositary upon which the check, draft 
or order was drawn or made or did not have 
sufficient funds in such account or credit 
with such depositary for payment in full of 
the check, draft or order, and that he failed 
within ten days after receiving notice of 
nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check, draft 
or order. 
The trial court refused to award attorney's 
fees because it was of the opinion the check was not 
a check within the definition of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (R.9,10). Section 70A-3-103, Utah Code Annoated 
defines a check as an instrument drawn on a bank which 
meets the following requirements: 
1) signed by the maker or drawer; 
2) contain an unconditional promise or 
order to pay a sum certain in money and 
no other promise, order, obligation, or 
power given by the maker or drawer except 
as authorized by this chapter; 
3) be payable to order or to bearer. 
The problem the trial court apparently found with the 
check was whether it was payable on demand or at a 
definate time. Section 70A-3-108, Utah Code Annoated, 
as amended, 1953, defines payable on demand as "instruments 
payable on demand include those payable at sight or upon 
presentation and those in which no time for payment is 
-5-
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stated!' The latter is certainly the situation in the 
instant case. This entire section of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code also makes it quite clear that all of the 
requirements set forth, must appear on the face of the 
instrument itself. It is therefore obvious that the 
instrument in question in this case is undoubtedly 
a check as it meets all these requirements on its face. 
No matter what statements accompanied its presentation, 
this instrument was still a check within the definition 
of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
The trial court also refused to grant attorney's 
fees on the basis that there was no evidence of fraudulent 
intent on the part of the Defendant because at the time 
the check was issued to Plaintiff it was accompanied 
with a statement that there were in sufficient funds 
in the bank to clear the check but that a deposit would 
be made and the check could be deposited in two weeks. 
Such a position by the trial court however, was clearly 
contra to the provisions of Section 7-15-2 (2), Utah 
Code Annoated, as amended, 1953. This section,as quoted 
above states what is prima facie evidence of the intent to 
defraud. The statute provides that proof that the check 
was dishonored upon presentation to the payee bank 
by reason of insufficient funds in the account and failure 
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of the maker to pay the check within ten days after 
he is given notice of the dishonor constitutes prima 
facie evidence that the check was fraudulently issued 
within the meaning of the statute. In the instant 
case there was clearly no problem about notice having 
been given to the Plaintiff that his check had been 
dishonored upon presentment to the bank. Mrs. Mosher 
testified that she personally notified the Defendant 
that his check had been dishonored upon two differant 
occassions and the check still had not been paid 
at the time of trial (~. 4). The trial court's argu-
ment that the statements accompanied with the check 
removed any intention to defraud would apply only 
to the sub paragraph one of Section 7-15-2. However, 
the situation in the instant case comes under sub para-
graph two in that at the time of presentment of the 
check for payment there was insufficient funds in the 
account for payment of the same. The Defendant's state-
ments to the Plaintiff at the time of issuance of the 
check clearly have no bearing upon the second subparagraph 
of this statute. 
It is readily apparent that the trial court 
erred in not awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorney's 
fees for this action in that first, the instrument 
in question was indeed check within the meaning 
-7-
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of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code and, second, that 
the situation involved is clearly the situation con-
templated in Section 7-15-2(2) Utah Code Annoated, as 
amended, 1953. Therefore reasonable attorney's fees 
should have been awarded. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING 
DEFENDANT WILLIAM NELSON PERSONALLY 
LIABLE AND HOLDING THAT THE CHECK WAS A 
CORPORATE OBLIGATION. 
In this case the trial court refused to 
hold the Defendant, William Nelson personally liable 
for the issuance of the bad check in question and awarded 
judgment against William Lord Corporation. The court 
based its ruling upon its ·finding "That William Lord 
Associates was intended by Defendant to be an assumed 
name for William Lord Corporation." (Findings of Fact, 
No. 8) Such a finding by the trial court was clearly 
against the weight of the evidence and contra to Utah 
Law. 
It is a clearly recognized legal principal 
and this court has held on numerous occassions that 
a corporation is clearly and uniquely a creature of 
statute,Shaw v Bailey-McCune Co., 355 P.2d 321, 11 
-8-
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Utah 2d 93~ Utah State Building Commission v Great 
American Indemnity Company,J40 P.2d 763. 105 Utah 11. 
In order for such a legal entity to come into being 
strict statutory requirements concerning the creation 
of the corporation must be followed if the corporation 
is to become incorporatPn and thereby afford the incor-
porators the protection from liability for which such 
corporations are created. 
Most courts will, as has this Court, in some 
instances however, infer the existence of a defacto 
corporation where it is apparent that substantial-efforts 
have been made to fullf ill the requirements of the 
statutes regarding incorporation but the incorporation 
has failed due to some technicality which was unforseen 
or unknown by the incorporators. In cases of this 
type however, it must be shown that substantial efforts 
were made on the part of the incorporators to conform 
to the requirements of Chapter 10, Title 16, Utah Code 
Annoated, as amended 1953. Vincent Drug Co. v. State 
Tax Comm., 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 P.2d 183. 
In the instant case, however, we have no such 
shwoing, In fact we have no evidence whatsoever con-
cerning any attempt of any person to incorporate a 
-9-
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company known as"William Lord Associates': All we have 
in this case is the inference of the trial court that 
since there was a corporation known as William Lord 
Corporation then William Lord Associates was intended 
to be an assumed name for that corporation. There 
clearly was no evidence to support this finding by 
the court as there was no evidence at all concerning 
any intentions of the Defendant. The only conclusion 
supported by the evidence is that the Defendant William 
Nelson be held personally liable. 
This position has been supported by this 
Court in Merchants Bank v. Goodfell, 140 P.2d 759. 
In that case the court ruled that where a draft was 
signed by one person, but had the name of another 
person or entity on both the upper and lower corner 
of the check,the person signing the check was the one 
liable for its payment. The court in its opinion based 
its conclusions on the fact that the name of the account 
on which a draft was drawn was not necessarily the only 
person who should be held liable for payment of the 
check or draft. This was clearly the situation in the 
instant case. 
The trial court also did not have sufficient 
evidence on which to base its finding that William 
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Lord Associates was intended to be an assumed name for 
William Lord Corporation in that Defendant had not 
complied with the provisions of Section 42-2-5, Utah 
Code Annoated, as amended, 1953. This section requires: 
Every person or persons who shall carry 
on, conduct or transact business in this 
state under an assumed name, whether such 
business be carried on, conducted or transacted 
as an individual, association, ownership, 
corporation or otherwise, shall file in the 
office of the Secretary of State a certificate 
setting forth the name under which such 
business is, or is to be carried on, con-
ducted or transacted •.•. 
This statute is quite clear in its purpose 
and scope and its requirements are clearly mandatory and 
prerequisite to the transaction of any business within 
the State of Utah. In the instant case the dictates 
of the statute clearly were not followed. No certificate 
of assumed and true name was filed entitling William 
~ord Corporation to conduct business in the State of 
Utah under the name William Lord Associates. Therefore 
any obligation entered into by "William Lord Associates" 
would necessarily have to be, in effect, an obligation 
entered into by the person who had attempted to obligate 
the company; in this case the Defendant William Nelson. 
The trial court's reasoning and holding in 
-11-
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this case sets a very dangerous precedent. The allow-
ance of an inferance by any court that any given entity 
was actually an assumed name for some corporation is 
a very dangerous precedent in that it opens the door 
for any person, when sued upon a personal obligation, 
to always raise the defense that "this really isn't a 
personal obligation, because I always intended to be a 
corporation but never quite got around to it." 
From the foregoing it is quite evident that 
due to the fact that no certificate for an assumed name 
was filed with the Secretary of State and also that there 
is no Utah corporation named "William Lord Associates" 
that the Defendant William Nelson should be personally 
liable. 
POINT THREE 
EVEN IF THE COURT HAD SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO 
CONCLUDE THAT THE CHECK IN QUESTION WAS PRO-
PERLY A CORPORATE OBLIGATION, THE DEFENDANT, 
WILLIAM NELSON SHOULD STILL BE PERSONALLY 
LIABLE. 
Even if the Court did have sufficient grounds 
to find that the Defendant William Nelson had always 
intended and was in fact doing business as William 
Lord Corporation, he should still be held personally 
liable. Most courts hold that generally a director or 
officer of a corporation does not incur personal lia-
bility for its wrongful acts merely by reason of his 
-12-
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official character. However, due to the unique cir-
cumstances of this case, William Nelson should be held 
personally liable for the amount of said check by 
reason of his being a director of the corporation and 
participating in an attempt to defraud the Plaintiff 
through William Lord Corporation. 
The main basis of this theory is the fact 
that the checks were fraudulently issued by a director 
of this corporation and, as argued in point one of 
this brief,, the court must presume that the check was 
issued with the wilfull intent to defraud the plaintiff. 
In Klockner v Keser, (1971) 20 Colo App 476, 488 P.2d,1135, 
the Colorado Supreme Court held the directors of a 
corporation personally liable for bad checks which were 
issued on the corporation account and signed by ihe 
Defendant. The pertinent_ rule, indicated the Colorado 
Court, was that although officers and directors of a 
corporation may not be held liable for the torts of the 
corporation solely by reason of their office, they may 
be held liable personally for the results of tortious, 
fraudulent misrepresentations where they approved of 
and sanctioned the making of such representations and 
knew or should have known of the fallsity of the rep-
-13-
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resentations and the consequential damages which were 
likely to result therefrom. 
A similar holding was also reached in the 
1973 case of Meehen v. Adams Enterprises, Inc., 507 
P.2d 849, 211 Kan 253. In that case, as in Kleckner, 
the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the officers or 
directors of a corporation shall be personally liable 
for a bad check "if it was apparent that at the time 
the checks were drawn the officers or directors knew 
or should have known that there were no funds in the 
bank to pay the check." supra, 851, 852. 
This same result was also reached in a 
New York case, Lippman Packing Corporation v. Rose 
(1953) 120 NYS 2d 461. In that case the court again 
ruled that officers or directors of the corporation 
would be personally liable for a bad check where the 
Defendant was chargeable with the knowledge of the 
state of the corporation's bank account. In Lippman 
it was again emphasized that the Defendant's conduct 
ammounted to actionable fraud and therefore held him 
personally liable. 
In each of the above cases it was noted that 
the major reason for the Court granting relief to the 
Plaintiffs against the Defenant officer or director 
-14-
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of the corporation personally was that there was sub-
stantial evidence that the Defendant knew or should 
have known the status of the bank account of the cor-
poration and that, nonetheless, he still wrote a check 
which was subsequently dishonored upn presentation. 
This is exactly the situation in the instant case. 
In this case,by the presumption of Section 7-15-2(2), 
Utah Code Annoated, argued in point one, we have 
prima facie evidence that this check was issued with 
the wilfull intent to defraud the Plaintiff with no 
evidence to rebut that presumption. It therefore _ 
follows that the situation in this case is directly 
analogous to the three cases quoted above. This 
Court then, in recognizing the soundness of the logic 
behind the holdings in the above three cases, is there-
fore urged to adopt a similar rule and hold the Defen-
dant, William Nelson personally liable for the amount 
of this check. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial 
court erred in not awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorney's 
fees and in not holding Defendant William Nelson personally 
liable for the amount of said check plus interest.~costs 
of court, and reasonable attorney's fees. The trial 
-15-
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